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A JUDICIAL BALANCING OF VALUES
BETWEEN CONFLICTING PUBLIC USES
IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
On June 25, 1963, the city council of Rochester, New York, unani-
mously adopted resolution No. 68-79 wherein they decided that a
neighborhood known as Genessee Crossroads was a "[S]ubstandard,
insanitary slum, blighted decadent area .. .1 Taking advantage of
New York General Municipal Law,2 an urban renewal agency was
created, known as the Genessee Crossroads Urban Renewal Project.
At the time of creation, the councilmen apparently realized that there
might be potential prior public use problems because the resolution
specifically provided that the project would require "[T]he location
and relocation of sewer and water mains and other public facili-
ties. . ,,
The case of City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas and Electric Corp.4
concerns itself with such a "public facility." The plot of land which
is the subject matter of the litigation was owned by Rochester Gas
and Electric Corp., and had been purchased in 1980 as the site of a
future electric sub-station. Although the company held the land for
thirty-seven years prior to the suit, it had never employed it for this
sub-station use. Instead, the land was used as a parking lot for com-
pany-owned vehicles. Litigation arose when the city brought a con-
demnation suit on behalf of the urban renewal agency seeking the
company land. Condemnation was allowed.
The court in Rochester correctly states the classic doctrine, that
land already in the public use may be taken if ".... 'the intention of the
legislature that such lands should be taken is shown by express terms
or necessary implication' [cites cases] which principle applies even
though the property devoted to a prior 'public use' was acquired by
purchase and not by condemnation [cites cases]." 5 This constantly
I. Rochester, N.Y., Resolution 63-79, City Council Proceedings, June 25, 1963,
at 188 [hereinafter cited as Resolution 63-79].
2. N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw 1 503 (McKinney 1965).
3. Resolution 63-79 at 189.
4. 54 Misc. 2d 855, 283 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
5. Id. at 856, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
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repeated doctrine has been the law of New York since it was first stated
in Ex Parte The Manhattan Co.6 Similar reverence is paid to the
doctrine in other jurisdictions.
In examining the enabling statute under which the urban renewal
project was created, it is found that the agency has the power to "ac-
quire [land] by ...condemnation or otherwise, in accordance with
the provisions of appropriate general, special or local law applicable
to the acquisition of real property... ."s (Italics supplied.) Obviously,
the prior public use rule is a part of "general law ... applicable to the
acquisition of real property."
Thus, if the court was correct in its determination that this land was
already being employed as a public use, and if the court did not adopt
the "more necessary use doctrine," it will be shown that condemna-
tion could not have been allowed.
There are certain exceptions to the classic doctrine which are well
recognized by the courts.9
In the 1st exception the sovereign itself is the condemnor.1 0 Since
the right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty,"1 the
sovereign (state or federal government) from which the power
originally flows can decide to reclaim the previously granted right of
eminent domain. An excellent statement of the exception appears in
United States v. Carmarck:-
In the instant case, we deal with broad language employed to
authorize officials to exercise the sovereign's power oF eminent
domain on behalf of the sovereign itself. This is a general au-
thorization which carries with it the sovereign's full powers except
such as are excluded expressly or by necessary implication. A dis-
tinction exists, however, in the case of statutes which grant to
others, such as public utilities [or urban renewal projects] the
6. 22 Wend. 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
7. "As a general proposition property already legally appropriated to a public
use cannot be taken for another public use without legislative authority--express
or implied." Dan, Problems in Condemnation of Property Devoted to Public
Use, 44 Tmxcs L. REv. 1517 (1966). See also Inhabitants of Springfield v. The
Conn. River Ry. Co., 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 63 (1849).
8. N.Y. GEzN. MuNic. LAw § 506 (McKinney 1965).
9. Anton, Private Partipication in Non-Residential Urban Renewal Projects in
New York, 12 BuFF Ao L. Rv. 538, 580-83 (1963).
10. Linnig v. United States, 328 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Certain Tracts of Land and Portions of the Right-of-Way of the Union Pacific
R.R., 225 F. Supp. 549 (D.C.D. Kan. 1964).
11. 1 NICHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14 (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman 1964).
12. 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
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power of eminent domain on behalf of themselves.... They
do not include sovereign powers greater than those expressed or
necessarily implied.... In such cases the absence of an express
grant of superiority over conflicting public uses reflects an ab-
sence of such superiority.' s
Obviously this exception could not have been utilized in Rochester
because the state was not even a party to the suit.
A corollary to the sovereign power exception exists in situations
when a sovereign-created agency is seeking to exercise the sovereign's
eminent domain power.4 This is accomplished by treating the agency
as the "alter ego" of the state, and as such, endowed with all of the
power which the state itself would possess.
May the granting of condemnation in Rochester be justified on the
basis of this "alter ego" exception? The answer must be "No" be-
cause the Genessee Crossroads Urban Renewal Project was created by
the City of Rochester,15 not the state legislature.-
There is another exception, known as the doctrine of "more nec-
essary use," which had not previously been recognized in New York.
Under this doctrine, the court will look at the relative uses of land
and will decide which is the more beneficial.'" A doctrine such as the
Ismore necessary use" doctrine seems to be dearly superior to the New
York method of requiring specific language of the legislature in order
to obtain land devoted to a prior public use. Of course, express legis-
lative wording will still prevail, but in its absence, an efficient way
of judicially determining whether or not condemnation shall lie seems
13. Id. at 243.
14. State ex rel State Highway Comm'n v. Hoester, 362 S.W.2d 519 (Mo.
1962); State ex rel State Highway Comm'r v. Union County Park Comm'n, 89 N.J.
Super. 202, 214 A.2d 446 (1965); City of Buffalo v. Day, 8 Misc. 2d 14, 162
N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
15. Resolution 63-79 at 188.
16. It is important to note that the state has created over one hundred urban
renewal agencies. N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAW §§ 570-674 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
17. White Mountain Power Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 106 N.H. 443, 213
A.2d 805 (1965); City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power
Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 373 P.2d 722 (1962); People ex rel Pub. Utils. Comm'n v.
City of Fresno, 254 Cal. App. 2d 76, 62 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Cir. Ct. App. 1967).
This method is even prescribed by statute in several states. Atz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12-112 (1956), CAL. Cry. PRo. CODE § 1241 (Deering 1967); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 7-703 (1947); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 93-9904 (1963); Nav. REv.
STAT. § 37.030 (1967); UTAH Corm ANN. § 78-34-3 (1953). See Dau, Problems
in Condemnation of Property Devoted to Public Use, 44 TExAs L. Rzv. 1517
(1966).
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highy desirable. (This seems to be the direction which the court in
Rochester is moving.) This direction may well mark the beginning
of a trend away from the traditional N.Y. method of dealing in prior
public use problems,'8 and toward the more sensible method known as
"more necessary use."' 9
The Court in Rochester hints that a prime consideration is the rela-
tive value to the public of an urban renewal area, as opposed to a
parking lot for public utility owned vehicles. This is evidenced by
statements to the effect that urban renewal is the official policy of the
state of New York and of the federal government,2 0 and that "[T]he
limitation sought to be applied here is not at all consistent with [an]
awakened approach in dealing with the evils of slums .... 21 The
court even inserts, as dicta, the following sentence: "[T]his is a situa-
tion where the prior 'public use' must yield to the imperative of the
greater public need.."22
Thus the court in Rochester goes out of its way to use the "more
necessary use" doctrine. Was this necessary to the decision in the case
or was the court trying to assure that relative benefit will be compared
in future cases? The latter seems to be the controlling factor.
The problem is that this is not a prior public use, and the court
knows it. The court recognizes that a private parking lot is not a
public use.23 It cites two cases holding this.24 Likewise, defendant
cannot say that it is merely holding the land for future public use.
Such future use only exempts the land if it is to be used in the im-
mediate future.25 But when, as in this case, the land already has been
18. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Morgenthau, 256 N.Y.S. 97 (Sup.
Ct. 1932); Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 2 v. Pace College,
50 Misc. 2d 806, 271 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1966); City of Buffalo v. Day, 8
Misc. 2d 14, 162 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
19. See cases cited supra note 17.
20. Citing N.Y. GaN. MUNiC. LAW § 501 at 54 Misc. 2d. 855, 858, 283
N.Y.S.2d 631, 634-35.
21. 54 Misc. 2d 855, 859, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
22. Id.
23. ". . . a purely private proprietary purpose to the exclusion of the public
...." Id. at 633.
24. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d 235
(1951); In re Parking Fields 11 and 1lA in the Inc. Village of Garden City, 217
N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd 15 App. Div. 2d 513, 222 N.Y.S.2d 413
(1961).
25. Bolin Lumber Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 270 Minn. 516, 134 N.W.2d
312 (1965); Pittsburg Ry. Co. v. Castle Shannon Borough, 105 Pittsburgh 243
(Pa. 1957).
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held for thirty-seven years, and when there are still no plans to use
it, it cannot be exempted from an authorized use of the eminent
domain power of a municipality.
The decision in the case (allowing condemnation) was unavoid-
able because (a) no prior use was involved and (b) the taking was
authorized by statute.26 However, although the court was aware that
the prior public use doctrine was not needed in this case, it neverthe-
less discussed that very doctrine. In reaching this decision the court
implicitly says even if it is admitted that this is a public use, the
"more necessary use" test will allow condemnation.
Clearly, the only conceivable reason the court would go through
this involved solution to this simple problem is a desire to make the
"more necessary use" doctrine a part of the New York law, thus pro-
viding an efficient way for judicially determining when condemnation
is desirable.
Richard Rakita
26. N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAW § 506 (McKinney 1965).
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